

‘A Chief Instrument for Overseas Expansion’: Revisiting the Conceptual Roots of Chinese Foreign Aid through Anti-West External Propaganda (1958-1961)

Joel Atkinson*

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Abstract

China pursues an official policy of overseas expansion – what leader Xi Jinping describes as becoming ‘a leading global power’ – with foreign aid playing an important role. Forgotten among the criticisms and countercriticisms of Chinese aid as a power expanding tool is that during the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese government criticized American and other Western aid on precisely this basis. This article explores this early Chinese thinking on Western aid, making use of the voluminous opinions on aid in the *Peking Review* from 1958 to 1961. It finds that beneath the anti-imperialist hyperbole, Western aid is understood as a tool of economic, political and military expansion. This past conceptualization of Western aid prefigures the competitiveness and expansionism in China’s present aid-mediated foreign policy.

Keywords: *International relations, foreign policy, Cold War, foreign aid, development*

1. Introduction

It is now commonplace for Chinese aid to be compared to ‘neocolonialism’ (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011; Reuters, 2011, June 11), and discussed as a tool of economic exploitation, hegemony and expanding influence (Bond, 2014; Chau, 2014; French, 2014; Naim, 2009). No less familiar are official Chinese objections that China could ever be compared to Western imperialism (Tao, 2015), and those pointing out that criticism of China has been overblown (Balasubramanyam, 2015; Brautigam, 2011; Cheru and Obi, 2011; Hirono and Suzuki, 2014; Sautman and Yan, 2006).

This conversation is clearly not going away. A recent authoritative estimate of China’s official finance provision sees it as rivalling the United

States in size (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2017, October). The benefits from Chinese economic engagement remain mixed or unclear (Chemingui and Bchir, 2010; Dollar, 2016; Elu and Price, 2010; Zhao, 2014). And, under Xi Jinping, China has rolled out a geopolitics-inspired infrastructure finance plan as the centre of an increasingly proactive foreign policy (Brewster, 2017; Du, Duan, Liu and Ma, 2016; Hu and Lu, 2016). This Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) features increased aid to Djibouti in association with China's first overseas military base (Blanchard, 2017). There are examples of military-related aid being stepped up in other ways too, such as the training of Afghan troops (Martina, 2018).

Little noted as this debate rolls on is the startling similarities between contemporary critics of Chinese aid – who Alden accuses of 'spurious and overblown' claims that 'China is planning to colonize Africa' (Alden, 2007: 127) – and the tropes the Chinese government employed in its criticisms of American and other Western aid during the Early-Cold War.

These similarities are no doubt somewhat coincidental. Perhaps both discourses embody a common logic of propaganda (Pratkanis and Turner, 1996: 190) or a shared psychology of enemy images (Asongu and Aminkeng, 2013; Silverstein and Flamenbaum, 1989)? Maybe both the US then, and China now, engage in behaviours common to all would-be superpowers (Mearsheimer, 2010), behaviours that are understood or misunderstood by observers in predictable ways?

A further possibility worth consideration is that these commonalities represent carryovers in Chinese aid thinking. Perhaps the concepts in reference to which China criticized Western aid during the Cold War foreshadowed present Chinese foreign aid policy, at least to some extent?

This paper takes a necessary first step in that direction, examining an official Chinese view of Western aid during the formative Great Leap Forward period (1958-1961). It finds that beneath the anti-imperialist hyperbole, Western aid is viewed as a tool of economic, political and military expansion. The enduring significance of that view at that time in China's history remains to be examined and debated. Nevertheless, this past conceptualization of Western aid presages the friction between China and countries such as the US and Japan in relation to China's current aid-mediated foreign policy.

2. Ideas Drive Aid Policy

The importance of ideas in shaping aid policies is obvious – even if how such a role could be meaningfully generalized is not. As discussed in Stokke (1989), domestic norms and traditions clearly interact with the international context to shape donor policies. Lancaster (2007) also highlighted the important role of these ideas or worldviews in determining aid. This mechanism

has an analogue in the strategic culture literature (Glenn, 2009; Johnston, 1995; Snyder, 1977), where ‘socially-transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a political community...help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals’ (Meyer, 2006: 20). Atkinson (2018) has demonstrated the importance of ideas in understanding other East Asian aid donors.

For China specifically, the role of (semi-)persistent ideas in Chinese aid policy has been quite extensively addressed, albeit inconclusively. Many have seen ideational drivers as predominantly related to China’s internal norms: around development and policy (Bräutigam, 2011; Reilly, 2012; Warmerdam and de Haan, 2015), its own long history of aid giving (Chau, 2014; Zhou and Xiong, 2017), and even the imperial tribute system (Copper, 2016). Others prefer to focus on socialization to the international aid donor community (Chin, 2012), and socialization through China’s history of aid receipt (Sato and Shimomura, 2013; Zhou, Zhang and Zhang, 2015).

In addition, as ideas are transmitted from the past in ‘accumulative traditions of discourse’ (Freedon, 1998: 755) (as well as borrowed from outside and invented), Chinese views on Western aid – thinking that occurred before it received Western aid or socialized with Western donors – have become part of present aid thinking at least to some extent. There has been some discussion along this vein in terms of how features of Chinese aid intentionally contrast with Western aid (e.g. Brautigam, 2011: 32). However, overall there has been little appreciation of the role that perceptions and representations of the Western aid during the Mao period may have played in shaping China’s aid policy.

3. ‘U.S. “Aid” Itself is a Very Good Teacher by Negative Example’¹

I have three pathways in mind when using the term ‘shaping.’ The first is that early-Cold War China saw in Western aid what it itself was doing – or at least wanted to do (i.e. mirror imaging) (Bronfenbrenner, 1961). Depictions of the West are thus a record of certain ideas that were operating in China in the past, and these ideas continue to operate in China now. As noted above, several authors have given considerable attention to parallels between China’s past thinking on various topics and aid thinking today, so such persistent ideas should not be a surprise. The main reservation would be that, as I discuss below, China’s depiction of Western aid was so nefarious that the idea that it represented a mirror into China’s motives seems incredible. But when shorn of its most contradictory and exaggerated elements, it becomes more plausible.

The second process would be that China acquired ideas on aid through some kind of ‘socialization at a distance’ with the West. The soft boundary

between the first pathway and this is the distinction between asocial emulating (copying another's means to reach one's own pre-existing ends) or mimicking ('whereby a novice initially copies the behavioural norms of the group in order to navigate through an uncertain environment') (Johnston, 2007: 23). Mimicking then blends into more 'social' types of socialization. However, rather than interacting with Western donors in social settings, China would be socializing to its own conceptualization of the West. This would further complicate Chin's (2012) two-way socialization, with the norms to which China currently endeavours to socialize the international community actually partly originating in China's perception of international norms decades before.

The third way would be the creation and operation of a 'myth' in the manner described by Snyder (1991). In this variety, domestic actors in China's past created an image of US aid for their own varied purposes. This myth served their common interests as a coalition, enabling a 'log roll' trading of support as each powerful group or individual pursued its specific interests. No one actor need even find this myth plausible – only expedient. However, this elite generated myth then shapes the thinking of others, like the public or the military rank-and-file. Indeed, it must shape thinking in such ways in order to be useful to the elites that created it. This process can result in what Snyder (1991: 41) calls 'blowback' where future generations have internalized such constructed myths and regard them as truth. There is good reason to believe that this internalization of Mao-era generated propaganda has occurred in areas outside of aid (Heilmann and Perry, 2011).

The three mechanisms work on different timeframes, but they all push in the same direction: the convergence of China's early-Cold War depiction of Western aid with recent Chinese aid practices. No doubt there are other ways that such correlation could occur even as other forces work to push China's earlier depiction of Western aid and current Chinese practices apart. We are not at a point, either theoretically or empirically, where such complex interactions and developments can be untangled and explained in any rigorous way. However, Cold War Chinese thinking about Western aid clearly merits consideration.

4. *Peking Review*: A Meaningful Record of Chinese Thinking on Aid?

The source material I use to approach formative Chinese thinking on Western aid are all issues of the English-language weekly magazine *Peking Review* (北京周报) (hereafter *PR*) from 1958 to 1961 (vols. I-IV).² *PR* began publishing in 1958, so this seems a natural starting point from which to engage with foundational concepts. The end point of 1961 was chosen as this 1958–1961 span represents a relatively distinct moment in Chinese history, i.e. the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and its immediate aftermath, and before

public acknowledgment of the Sino-Soviet split. This provides for a coherent voice. Without the ‘domestic feelings of buoyancy and superiority elicited by the Great Leap Forward’ and the positive view of Soviet superpower aid to contrast against Western aid, later periods would perhaps not be as interesting or as relevant to China’s current condition (Wang, 2006: 12).

PR itself is a voluminous source, with much to say about Western aid (or ‘so-called “aid”’ in *PR* nomenclature). As an official voice, it is the output of bargaining, jostling and power struggles among the different groups and players within the party-state. Logically, the various images of Western aid produced and reproduced by these players will have shaped the final ‘velocity’ of *PR*’s depiction in direct proportion to their power and influence. Hence, in a very real sense, *PR* is a record of the party-state’s net thinking on Western aid; not an average view, but a view reflecting the underlying ideas and power of the players involved. *PR* is also intended for a universal audience, speaking for example to developing countries, and to Western leftists and governments. And while not intended for the Chinese public and displaying different emphases to Chinese-language publications like the *People’s Daily* (人民日) or *Hongqi* (红旗), it must nevertheless not contradict the aims of inward-directed propaganda (Ungor, 2009: 53-54, 98-99, 111, 113, 118-119, 162). So, it is as close as we can get to being able to ask a personified Chinese party-state what it ‘thinks’ about Western aid.

One objection is that as propaganda, *PR* bears no consistent relationship to the image in the heads of policymakers. But this problem is manageable for two reasons. First, propaganda is intended to be influential. It may often fail in this respect, but it is certainly more influential than views that remain private to a small cabal of insiders. It is the public image that has the widest and most lasting influence. And even where its creators knowingly produced falsehoods, they nevertheless believed themselves to be conveying a higher order normative and empirical truth – that the PRC is ‘good’ relative to the US and others, and the direction of history (Ungor, 2009: 59-60, 114, 150).³

Second, public and private images of Western countries during this period correspond to a considerable extent, including even where those images appear exaggerated and cartoonish. For example, *PR* warns its readers that despite posing as friend to Africa, as ‘a popular proverb in Africa goes, “a monkey is still a monkey even if it cuts off its tail”’ (*Peking Review*, 1961e: 14); and, ‘the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism will never change’ (*Peking Review*, 1960j: 14). This image of implacable US aggression aligns with what Mao and most members of the Chinese leadership espoused in private. Similarly, Mao and his close associates’ belief in ‘a global “anti-capitalist wave”’ that ‘was challenging American hegemony’ is prominent throughout *PR* (Westad, 1998: 167). Also present is Mao’s view of US nuclear weapons as an irrelevance, a view that famously

dismayed Khrushchev (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 60; Shu, 1999). Indeed, no lesser authority than Hans Morgenthau (1962: 306) saw the US' Western identity and 'semicolonial exploitation of backward nations' contributing to its aid being 'frequently suspect'. It should not be surprise that *PR* held an extreme version of this view.

Despite embodying truths about China's thinking at that time, there are qualifications. Many contemporaneous Western scholars read *PR* far too naively. For example, it is not a straightforward source of 'perceptions' (Ray, 1975). It is written to influence – both as a means to achieve the Chinese leadership's goals – and to present those leaders in the best possible light. In the midst of one of the worst famines and manmade disasters in history, *PR* tells its readers that China's experience is 'a powerful proof' of the benefits of economic independence: 'our grain output has more than doubled...everyone has food. This is a miracle, yet a fact' (*Peking Review*, 1960i: 15). *PR* also informs us that Sino-Soviet relations represent 'unprecedented harmony' even as the acrimonious split turns irreversible (*Peking Review*, 1960b: 10).

PR also draws a strident bright line between socialist aid and the 'so-called "aid"' of the imperialists, which are 'completely different in nature' (*Peking Review*, 1961g: 9). The following passage is indicative:

the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union is assisting many Asian and African countries to develop their independent economies, with no political strings attached to the assistance. All these are facts that cannot be altered by any rumours, slanders or attempts to sow seeds of discord. The imperialists are always slandering the socialist countries sympathy and active support for the national liberation movement as 'expansion,' 'indirect aggression' and 'infiltration.' Being imperialists, they indeed cannot understand why the socialist countries could have consistently extended such help without any selfish aims. (*Peking Review*, 1958j: 6)

Elsewhere, *PR* relates an elderly Guinean man's opinion that 'Imperialism did every bad thing. By contrast, the Chinese people are giving us generous assistance' (*Peking Review*, 1961c: 17).

A further feature is what could be best described as Orwellian double-speak. I mean this not in the sense of 'slavery is freedom', though it does that, too;⁴ but in the way that country *X* is employed as a surrogate to criticize country, group or individual *Y*. So, aid-related statements about the US, Yugoslavia and Albania among others, serve as veiled criticisms of the USSR or Khrushchev. Also, positive statements about the USSR often appear to be aimed at shaming the Soviets back onto the right track rather than reporting truths or facts as *PR*'s producers understood them (see Ungor, 2009: 170-171; Wang, 2006).


Fortunately, there is no need to unravel what each utterance in *PR* meant to those who produced and consumed it (for historical context see Atkinson,

2019). Our focus is on ideas about Western aid. To the extent that readers understood a particular reference to the US to actually be about the Soviet Union for example, then that logically contributes to ideas about the Soviet Union – not the US. Ultimately, I would argue, it is the public depiction of the US (and to a lesser extent other Western donors) that was transmitted most influentially across space and time, not the various individual and private depictions.

5. On the Correct Handling of Contradictions in PR

The final, and perhaps most important, caveat that needs to be addressed is *PR*'s contradictions. Inconsistencies occur not only between articles and issues, but also within the same article or even within the same paragraph. For example, aid can be 'highly profitable' (*Peking Review*, 1959j: 9), 'extracting huge profits' (*Peking Review*, 1958d: 18) and 'surely helps the U.S.' (*Peking Review*, 1961j: 17) (see Figure 1), while also being a 'burden' that has made the US' 'economic situation...more and more difficult' (*Peking Review*, 1960a: 17). Aid to reactionary regimes 'enslave the population' (*Peking Review*, 1961h: 11) and 'turn these areas into American colonies' (*Peking Review*, 1958b: 18), but these regimes are 'white elephants' and 'bottomless holes' (*Peking Review*, 1959k: 11).⁵

Figure 1 "Uncle Sam's Aid Desk"



Source: *Peking Review* (1961j), p. 17.

As propaganda, moral discourse, and transmitter of veiled messages, *PR*'s producers clearly did not consider that consistency across articles and issues should get in the way of a higher-level consistency about the good and the bad, which direction history was moving, and sending messages that needed to be sent. The producers of *PR* also evidently believed that a 'Marxist-Leninist' interpretation of imperialism should find contradictions. Marx viewed capitalism as exploitative, irrational, war prone, and driven by contradictions (Marx, Engels and Gasper, 2005: 25). Lenin saw the capitalist drive for profits as leading to monopolistic consolidation, and an imbalance between production and consumption. The resultant surplus savings drove imperialism, contradictorily leading to resistance and world war which would bring capitalism to an end (Lenin, 2010). The producers of *PR*

clearly desired this sheen of theoretical authority from Marx and Lenin, and the text displays the relevant phraseology, such as references to ‘monopoly capital’ and ‘capital export’ and ‘Lenin’s scientific thesis’ (*Peking Review*, 1959j: 13; 1960f: 19; 1961a: 12). However, they did not want to be bound by frameworks, and the explanations of Western donors lack the internal inconsistency Marx and Lenin could manage. So rather than a framework, ‘Marxist-Leninism’ becomes something of an affectation.

A good example is the link between capitalism and war. A major sticking point in Lenin’s ‘economic explanation’ of World War I is why profit-seeking and future-orientated capitalists would blindly drive toward a value-destroying war. Nevertheless, the logic of high inequality in developed countries leading to militarized and destabilizing competition for colonies is persuasive enough that it still has proponents today (Hauner, Milanovic and Naidu, 2017). However, *PR* stretches Lenin to the extreme, with the US pursuing a policy of ‘aggression and war’ (*Peking Review*, 1959c: 28, 29; 1959j: 6, 8) and ‘trying to include the whole African continent in its range of military aggression’ (*Peking Review*, 1959n: 14).

As a mouthpiece of China’s leaders, the closest *PR* has to a consistent framework is what those leaders – especially Mao – were thinking. And these leaders – Mao above all – habitually reduced the world to contradictions.⁶

Perhaps the most important of these leadership-derived and inherently contradictory frames for aid in *PR* is that of US imperialism as paper tiger (Mao, 1977: 308-311). A paper tiger image of the enemy is a relatively common misperception for leaders to have, and for elites to both buy into and foster. As Snyder (1991: 5-6) explains, this image justifies almost any conclusion a leader or group of leaders wishes to come to, and creates a strong justification for pursuing security through expansion. Whether the US seems strong or weak, aggressive or defensive at any particular moment, it is a paper tiger that must be vigorously opposed. This frame results in a depiction of the US aid donor engaging in contradictory and self-defeating behaviour. For example, *PR* tells us that ‘since U.S. “aid” aims at dominating the capitalist world it inevitably leads to the very opposite of what the U.S. aggressors wished for’ (*Peking Review*, 1959k: 11). Another example is, ‘The people will neither be bought by imperialism nor cowed by it. Imperialism is outwardly strong but feeble within, because it has no support among the people’ (*Peking Review*, 1958p: 10).

6. Aid for Expansion

Whatever contradictions are present in imperialist aid, they achieve something of a synthesis in its ultimate *raison d’être* – expansion. According to *PR*, ‘U.S. aid’ is ‘a chief instrument for overseas expansion’ (*Peking Review*, 1961a:

17). On this point, there is ‘fundamental agreement among the U.S. ruling cliques on the use of U.S. “aid”’ (*Peking Review*, 1959k: 11). This expansion is aggression carried out everywhere (*Peking Review*, 1960a: 17), the product of ‘imperialist ambitions to dominate the world’ (*Peking Review*, 1960g: 22). Similarly, ‘Japanese monopoly capital’ seeks ‘economic expansion abroad’ to ultimately achieve ‘Asian hegemony’ (*Peking Review*, 1958f: 8-9).

The implicit model could be described as one of intuitive realism. There is no awareness of insecurity or structure.⁷ Instead, the US’ desire to expand is seemingly the result of a malign inner drive. The enemy seeks to offensively expand its power everywhere and anyway possible, and will do so until China defensively expands its power to stop it. Not coincidentally, there are strong parallels with this expansionist enemy image and how the United States saw the Soviet Union and China during the same period. Notably, the famous ‘NSC 68’ document from 1950 called for ‘A more rapid build-up of political, economic and military strength’ as a defensive reaction to Soviet expansion along these same dimensions. The deployment of aid and other tools were seen as taking ‘the current Soviet Cold war technique’ and using them against the Soviet Union (Truman Papers, 1950, April 12: 54-56).

Within this intuitive model, aid shares a similar condition with Max Weber’s ‘power politics,’ in which a fight *for* the means of power is a prelude to political action *by those means of power*. Thus, ‘the *means of politics...becomes the goal of the politician*’ (Bruun, 2012: 264). In other words, for *PR*, aid is a tool with which to struggle for power, power that is crucial in deciding the overall struggle between China and the West, and with the United States in particular.

In the next section I will break down *PR* depictions of aid as a means of expansion. However, it should be kept in mind that in line with the intuitive model, *PR* sees these different aspects as interwoven and reinforcing (see Figure 2.), even if the nature of this interweaving is not articulated consistently or clearly.

Figure 2 “Sowing the New Crop”



Sowing the New Crop
 News Item: Thousands of specially trained American men and women will be dispatched by Kennedy under the signboard of a “Peace Corps” to “aid” many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America
 By Fang Cheng

Source: *Peking Review* (1961d), p. 22.

7. Economic Expansion Marxist-Leninist Style

The overarching model or paradigm is what the producers of *PR* would label ‘Marxist-Leninist’. This is the Marx-and-Lenin-inspired and contradiction-heavy view discussed above. A good example of this view is the following explanation of why the imperialist powers conclude long term trade agreements:

for the purpose of permanently controlling these markets so that they can dump their commodities [i.e. tradeable manufactured goods] and buy up strategic raw materials and other goods at fixed and low prices. This is one of the dirtiest imperialist tricks to intensify plunder of the colonies and underdeveloped countries (*Peking Review*, 1958i: 12).

Within this view, a desire for permanent ‘control’ is central; and, it is both (contradictorily) generated and necessitated by capital export (*Peking Review*, 1961a: 13-14). The US controlling ‘instigates’ while countries that receive military aid are passively ‘dragged’ in against their will (*Peking Review*, 1959j: 6). Imperialists (contradictorily) collaborate and compete. So the US holds a ‘sinister aim’ to take the place of ‘older colonialists’ (*Peking Review*, 1958s: 21) or step into [their] shoes’ (*Peking Review*, 1959n: 14), with economic expansion ‘invariably accompanied by other forms of expansion’ (*Peking Review*, 1958s: 21) (see Figure 3). This imperialist motivation is contrasted with Chinese and wider socialist economic relations and aid, which promote political independence not control, and aim to build up manufacturing and economic independence in underdeveloped countries (*Peking Review*, 1961b: 7).

Figure 3 Gilded Chains



This ‘Marxist-Leninist’ explanation is sufficiently vague and contradictory to encompass the full gamut of Western aid activities. However, beneath this umbrella concept it is possible to discern somewhat distinct models of what is driving the US and other Western countries, models that do not require the protagonists to seek colonial political control.

Source: *Peking Review* (1959d), p. 24.

8. Subsidizing Manufacturing Outputs and Inputs: List Meets Lenin

The first of these could be described as Listian–Leninist in that it shares Friedrich List’s focus on strengthening a donor’s production relative to both own consumption and the production of other countries without requiring Lenin-style colonial control (List, 1909). However, since the US as portrayed in *PR* shifts between seeking control, having control and losing control, there is of course significant overlap between the two.

Most straightforwardly, the Listian goal is sought through ‘dumping’ (see Figure 4). For instance, *PR* mocks the US’s dumping of ‘musical instruments, swivel chairs, cold drinks...and nylons’ as part of military aid to Turkey (*Peking Review*, 1958a: 18) (see Figure 5). In Laos, ‘U.S. economic “aid”’ takes the form:

of surplus goods flooding the Laotian market. Most of these, like passenger cars and other luxury goods, have no relationship to the needs of the people. On the contrary, they have dealt crushing blows to the few Laotian national enterprises in existence...because of the dumping (*Peking Review*, 1959i: 10).

Figure 5. Cartoon Mocking the US’ Dumping of Nylon Stockings as Part of Military Aid to Turkey



Source: *Peking Review* (1958a), p. 18.

American industrial production: ‘Buying U.S. goods at a high price, they are thus doubly exploited by U.S. monopoly capital’ (*Peking Review*, 1960e: 10).

Figure 4 US Dumping



Source: *Peking Review* (1960n), p. 24.

PR does not explain how Laotian enterprises producing goods with ‘no relationship to the needs of the people’ came to exist in order to be crushed by cheap American alternatives. More intelligible is the charge that US textiles and coffee had damaged local industries.

Also straddling the line between Lenin and List is the characterization of the West as combining a focus on securing raw materials and expanding exports of manufactures (e.g. *Peking Review*, 1959k: 10). Through control, the US has turned Latin America into ‘single pattern economies’ feeding

Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's plan for what would become the Asian Development Bank (the 'Asian Development Fund' or 'Southeast Asia development fund') is a 'revival of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"' (*Peking Review*, 1958o: 19). According to the article, Japan aims to:

exploit the mines in Southeast Asia on behalf of the United States, supply this region with industrial equipment and buy rice and cotton from the Southeast Asian countries. In other words, Southeast Asia is to be 'developed' by means of U.S. capital, Japanese technology, and its own resources, to serve as an outlet for Japan's expanded productive forces. Japan aims to in this way, oust Britain and West Germany, and ultimately the US, from these markets (*Peking Review*, 1958f: 9).

Like the United States (*Peking Review*, 1958n: 15; 1958l: 9), Japan's expansion follows a consistent imperialist formula, patterned on an industrial metropole and 'an agricultural Southeast Asia' (*Peking Review*, 1959l: 15). PR informs its readers that war reparation payments plus 'mostly supplementary...economic co-operation [agreements] are the backbone [of Japan's] overall economic expansion' (*Peking Review*, 1959l: 15).

The economic policy function of Japan's aid results in restrictions that recipients do not like. India was 'most dissatisfied' with 'too many restrictions' on loans. In Cambodia, Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama 'was quite embarrassed when leading officials there contrasted Japanese "aid" with the unconditional Soviet and Chinese assistance.' Also, no projects had been carried out in Burma due to 'conditions' (*Peking Review*, 1959l: 16).

As Pettis (2013: 34-37, 146) explains, exporting capital necessarily means importing demand, and exporting capital is the same as exporting goods though the causes are different. Chinese policymakers presumably understood this fact by way of Lenin (2010: Ch. 7):

Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition held undivided sway was the export of goods. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of capital.

Accordingly, a 1961 article that discusses West Germany's 'overseas expansion' in the 'underdeveloped countries' and 'spheres of influence of the other imperialists.' According to the article, Germany is 'making a big effort to increase its export of capital and goes in for so-called "aid" to the underdeveloped countries in a big way.' The examples of this expansion is mostly increased exports (*Peking Review*, 1961d: 23). However, in at least one instance, the direction of causation flips, with 'the export of commodities... one of the chief means to compensate for deficits caused by the enormous U.S. expenditures abroad' (*Peking Review*, 1961a: 14).

9. Subsidizing Overseas Investment

For *PR*, overseas investment–capital export is the chief means to frame the US’ aid-giving as imperialism (via Lenin) despite its lack of colonies. This involves a long chain of reasoning: aid is exported capital, imperialists export capital, therefore the aid-giving US is imperialist; and imperialists seek/have colonies, therefore the US seeks/has colonies through aid.

Accordingly, *PR* often sees the subsidizing of overseas investment as the most important goal of aid (e.g. *Peking Review*, 1961m: 14). *PR* has Lenin backwards when it explains that, as the US has ‘fewer colonies under its direct control than the other imperialist countries...capital export...[is the] chief means of penetrating into the spheres of influence of other imperialist countries’ (*Peking Review*, 1961a: 13). Foreign aid is described as the ‘most rapacious form of the export of capital’ (*Peking Review*, 1960g: 20). It is also ‘a special kind of capital export, because it also opens the way for the export of huge amounts of capital by American enterprises’ (*Peking Review*, 1959k: 10). One article puts it thus:

An outstanding feature in the post-war years is that the U.S. Government itself has been exporting capital on a large scale to pave the way for private investments. A good part of the ‘economic aid’ which the U.S. Government provides for under-developed countries has been spent on building roads, ports or power stations (*Peking Review*, 1961m: 14).

The same article makes clear that overseas aid, including multilateral aid, is in reality a subsidy for capital:

Government...gives direct financial aid to private investments overseas through the Import-Export Bank and the Development Loan Fund or the U.S.-controlled International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The U.S. Government also undertakes to carry the ‘risks’ of private investments being requisitioned by foreign countries and of war losses (*Peking Review*, 1961m: 14).

Linking back to the Listian discussion above, for *PR*, foreign investment is particularly focused on resources (see Figure 6). For example, ‘technical aid’ missions ‘prospect the resources and gather information’ to facilitate capital inflows (*Peking Review*, 1959j: 7) and

Figure 6 “In His Dreams...”



Source: *Peking Review* (1959n), p. 22.

American ‘penetration’ (*Peking Review*, 1959f: 16). According to another article, through investments ‘the United States is energetically plundering such strategic materials as oil, uranium, aluminium, manganese, etc. in Africa and extracting fabulous profits...’ (*Peking Review*, 1959n: 14) (see Figure 7).

10. Cultivating Friendly Elites for Economic Expansion

The US uses aid to maintain and develop relationships with friendly governments or elites to further its economic expansion (see Figure 8). According to one article:

the so-called ‘aid’ of the imperialists to the economically backward countries is in fact a kind of export of capital, aiming to intensify aggression, exploitation and domination over the recipient countries, to squeeze from them maximum profits, and to foster the comprador bourgeoisie (*Peking Review*, 1960k: 12).

Another informs us that US support for ‘a handful of the most reactionary traitors in various countries’ is designed to ‘encroach upon the sovereignty and national interests of these countries without let or hindrance’ (*Peking Review*, 1960i: 6) (see Figure 9). Aid to reactionary rulers and US puppets (*Peking Review*, 1961h: 11) is used to sabotage national independence (*Peking Review*, 1960c: 26). One example is Batista in Cuba; thanks to ‘support it gets from U.S. imperialism’ (*Peking Review*, 1958s: 29) the ‘Batista gang’s betrayal of Cuba’s national interests’ has seen ‘U.S. monopoly domination’ reach ‘its zenith’ (*Peking Review*, 1959a: 17).

Figure 7 “Washington’s ‘Aid’ Pump”



Source: *Peking Review* (1961l), p. 13.

Figure 8 Cartoon Mocking US Aid to Lebanon



Source: *Peking Review* (1958e), p. 21.

Figure 9 Accra Santa



“All I want now is some snow in Accra and they’ll think I’m Santa Claus!”

Source: *Peking Review* (1958r), p. 22.

11. Expanding Influence

The US further seeks influence through aid as a goal *per se*, not only in pursuit of economic goals (*Peking Review*, 1958l: 9; 1960c: 26; 1960g: 29; 1961p: 12). For example, it allows the US to ‘isolate Cuba’ even as it achieves its Leninist goal of economically controlling Latin America’ (*Peking Review*, 1960m: 13). The US also provides aid to Yugoslavia to encourage revisionist ideology and divide the unity of the socialist camp.

This drive for influence is within the wider framework of imperialism. Empires seek class-derived monopolistic economic goals via Lenin, but also influence and status more in line with China’s native understanding of the imperial drive (see e.g. Perdue, 2015). Hence, ‘neo-colonialists have been... expanding their influence by military and economic ‘aid,’...and edging out the old colonialist forces in an attempt to supplant them’ (*Peking Review*, 1960g: 7) (see Figure 10). Moreover, ‘The ultimate goal of the new U.S. colonialists is, obviously, to eliminate the influence of other colonialists and supersede them in Africa’ (*Peking Review*,

Figure 10 “Give Me Your Bag First!”



“Give me your bag first!”

Hung Huang in “Wen Hui Bao”

Source: *Peking Review* (1958d), p. 18.

1960l: 17). The US aims to bring French and British colonies and former colonies ‘under its exclusive control’ (*Peking Review*, 1958e: 20). *PR* sees the US trying to ‘convert Cambodia into a vassal state of the United States’ (*Peking Review*, 1960b: 3). Vassalage is freighted with meaning for China, with Cambodia at various times a tributary state of imperial China (Stuart-Fox, 2003) and old Chinese maps referring to the colonies of the imperialist powers as vassals (屬 *shǔ*) (Callahan, 2012: 100).

PR regularly characterizes aid as an influence expanding trick (see Figure 11), often drawing on common Chinese metaphors. For example, aid is a ‘cloak’ (*Peking Review*, 1960g: 11), ‘a black lie’ (*Peking Review*, 1961a: 13),

Figure 11 “Beware of the Yanks Bearing Gifts!”



Source: *Peking Review* (1959h), p. 34.

and a ‘sugar-coated cannonball’ (*Peking Review*, 1959o: 21). It is ‘passing a fish eye off for a pearl’ (*Peking Review*, 1960i: 15). Perhaps *PR*’s preferred metaphor for aid is as ‘bait’ (*Peking Review*, 1959d: 10; 1959l: 15; 1960b: 3) (see Figure 12). Once countries are ‘on the hook’ – a reference to Rockefeller’s ‘infamous letter’ to Eisenhower (*Peking Review*, 1958k: 13; 1959k: 10) – aid becomes a ‘lever of political blackmail’ (*Peking Review*, 1959j: 9) amounting to a ‘sort of plague’ (*Peking Review*, 1959k: 11) or poison (*Peking Review*, 1958g: 9) (see Figure 13).⁸

Figure 12 “Bait”



Source: *Peking Review* (1959j), p. 7.

Figure 13 “The Salesman”




Source: *Peking Review* (1961h), p. 18.

12. Military Power Expansion

Aid is also a way to expand strategic, as distinct from economic goals or diplomatic influence. Such strategic ‘development assistance’ is a means to exploit strategic resources, induce countries to join the Western military bloc, facilitate military bases and build strategically significant infrastructure (*Peking Review*, 1958o: 19; 1959j: 7; 1960c: 26) (see Figures 14-16).

Military expansion-directed aid naturally also connects into the cultivation of friendly elites (see Figure 17). Through its aid, the US could exercise control over Ethiopia (*Peking Review*, 1958o: 19), and turn South Vietnam into ‘a cat’s-paw’ (*Peking Review*, 1959f: 16-17).

Figure 14 “Joining Up the Chain”




Source: *Peking Review* (1961o), p. 8.

Figure 15 The Nurse



Source: *Peking Review* (1958o), p. 19.

Figure 16 Aid and Military Bases



Source: *Peking Review* (1959k), pp. 9-10.

Figure 17 “Going Down – and Out!”



Going Down – and Out! Cartoon by Ying Tso
Source: *Peking Review* (1960h), p. 31.

Discussions of Listian-type expansion and influence return back to Lenin through this strategic dimension of Western aid. However, as it is approaching Lenin from the other direction as it were, it necessarily has Lenin backwards. For Lenin (2010), under capitalism, war is the means for the imperialists to expand their share of colonies and their ‘spheres of influence for finance capital’ in order to find an outlet for excess production and capital. At times, *PR* adopts the opposite direction of causation, with ‘economic expansion... merely a prelude to military aggression’ (*Peking Review*, 1959f: 23). Moreover, “aid”

can be a means to attain uranium and oil for ultimately strategic rather than economic reasons (*Peking Review*, 1959m: 25; 1961n: 19). Elsewhere, US imperialism violates ‘the sovereignty of other nations on the pretext of “aid” to plunder their riches to feed its own munitions industry’ (*Peking Review*, 1960a: 16). From this perspective, raw materials are not inputs to capitalism, but to militarism (*Peking Review*, 1960c: 26). In line with this view, another article states that ‘the United States has...penetrated Africa under the guise of “aid” and “development” to support dirty colonial wars and for the plunder of strategic raw materials’ (*Peking Review*, 1960l: 17).

13. Concluding Discussion

Much has changed in the world – and in China – since the period considered here. Nevertheless, *PR*’s view of aid as a tool of expansion – the one point on which its discourse is most consistent, resonates with aspects of Chinese policy today.

That China has an official policy of economic, political and military expansion should no longer be controversial. Under leader Xi Jinping, China now officially ‘strives for achievement’ in the pursuit of the ‘great renaissance of the Chinese nation’ (Terrill et al., 2016; Yan, 2014). Xi told the 2017 CPC National Congress that he aims for China to ‘become a leading global power’ with a ‘world-class’ war-winning military (Haas, 2017). The role of aid in this expansion should not be exaggerated, but it clearly ‘is an important tool in China’s diplomacy, which serves its political, economic, strategic and global image interests’ (Zhang and Smith, 2017: 2330). As Chinese scholars Zhou et al. (2015: 9) see it:

...foreign aid can directly or indirectly realize a donor country’s economic interests in the recipient country. In many cases, foreign aid activities serve to pave the way for trade and investment.... In addition, through financial support to the recipient country, it is possible for the donor country and recipient country to enter into policy dialogues about sensitive problems [to cause] the recipient country to adopt donor country values and policy positions. This is why foreign aid became an irreplaceable strategic tool after World War II, not only bringing short-term economic and political benefits to the donor country, but also influencing the economic and political system of the recipient country, and even its choice of development path.

This correspondence between the view of American and other Western ‘aid’ in *PR* and policy and aid thinking today is no doubt due to many different factors. Still, it plausibly represents some persistence of ideas about aid within Chinese policymaking circles from the late 1950s–early 1960s until now (see also Atkinson, 2021).

Indeed, there are numerous intellectual threads connecting the period considered here and the present day. Some of these threads are direct. Chau (2014: 148) calls attention to the fact that: ‘China was never exclusively revolutionary or ideological; rather, it exhibited long term, pragmatic behaviour from the very beginning on the [African] continent.’ And, Howard L. Boorman’s (1960: 585) description of China’s primary foreign-policy goal in the late 1950s – a ‘revitalized Chinese national power, under Communist control’ and ‘recognized status as a major world power on its own terms’ – could easily be mistaken for a description of Xi Jinping’s China.

There are also intriguing examples of conceptual reversals of polarity. Marx criticized economic nationalism, yet it is List that has ‘turned out to be a rather better guide than Marx to the concerns and behaviour of emerging states, including socialist states’ (Lovell, 1995: 142-143; Szporluk, 1991), with China no exception (Breslin, 2011). In addition, thinking behind the Greater Co-Prosperty Sphere did inform postwar Japan, though shorn of its military element (Samuels, 2007: 36). This Japanese model was an important influence on Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, with Pettis (2013: 80) characterizing current Chinese economic policy as:

mostly a souped-up version of the Asian development model, probably first articulated by Japan in the 1960s, and shares fundamental features with a number of periods of rapid growth – for example Germany during the 1930s, Brazil during the ‘miracle’ years of the 1960s and 1970, and the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s.

There are also reversals in military areas, with, for example, the Mao-era maligned Alfred Thayer Mahan now very much embraced (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008: 29).

None of this should be read as equating the image of the US and the West in *PR* with China today. However, it reminds us to balance claims of how Chinese aid thinking has evolved and changed with cognizance of how it has also stayed the same.

It is also important to appreciate that, to the extent that it has had an influence, the GLF-era image of Western aid is likely to have been negative. Perhaps through the mechanism Snyder labelled ‘blowback,’ this image of Western aid has been transmitted across time, without bringing private elite understandings of its context – or an appreciation of the bias and flaws of those elites – with it. The image of the US in particular, is so expansionistic and ruthless that it should be alarming if it has served as a positive model for Chinese aid. No less troubling is the possibility that this image acts as a kind of internalized strawman, working to make almost anything China does look benevolent by comparison to Chinese policymakers, bestowing considerable moral licence.

I want to finish where I started: (neo-)colonialism. As the producers of *PR* well understood, comparing a powerful country's relationship with developing countries to colonialism is a means to problematize, and perhaps even interrupt, that relationship. It is a hard-to-refute charge where there are perceptions of racial differences, and obvious imbalances in the trade of manufactured goods and raw materials, investment, and power. And like historical colonialism, such relationships can be negative or unfair, and therefore deserving of interruption and reform. This is especially the case when one believes, as Lenin, List and many others have,⁹ that industrialization is the surest route to development and political autonomy, not free trade. The Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria's opinion is informative in this respect:

So China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism. The British went to Africa and India to secure raw materials and markets. Africa is now willingly opening itself up to a new form of imperialism. The days of the Non-Aligned Movement that united us after colonialism are gone. China is no longer a fellow underdeveloped economy – it is the world's second-biggest, capable of the same forms of exploitation as the west. It is a significant contributor to Africa's deindustrialisation and underdevelopment. (Sanusi, 2013)

Sanusi goes on to talk about his father, Nigeria's ambassador to Beijing in the early 1970s:

He adored Chairman Mao Zedong's China, which for him was one in which the black African – seen everywhere else at the time as inferior – was worthy of respect. His experience was not unique. A romantic view of China is quite common among African imaginations – including mine.

It is ironic that through the pages of the *Peking Review* and elsewhere, the Chinese government did its best to propagate the concept that securing markets for manufactured exports, raw material imports, and foreign investment are bad. In doing so, it may well have helped provide the tinder for the backlash faced by the current generation of leaders engaged in expansion abroad.

Notes

* Joel Atkinson is professor in the Department of Chinese Studies, Graduate School of International and Area Studies at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) in Seoul, South Korea. Address: #812 Faculty Bldg, 107 Imun Rd, Seoul 02450, Republic of Korea. <Email: Joel.Atkinson@hufs.ac.kr; atkinson.joel@gmail.com> Phone: +82 10 5684 1066.

1. *Peking Review* (1959k: 11).
2. Scanned PDF copies of *Peking Review* for this and later periods are in the public domain and available from the following websites: <<http://www.massline.org/>

PekingReview/index.htm> and <<https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/index.htm>>.

3. For a for a parallel with history textbooks, see Callahan (2012: 21).
4. For example, commune ‘canteens can help promote the collective spirit among the peasants who have broken away from the centuries-old habit of eating at home’ (*Peking Review*, 1958q: 4) and the passage on ‘Happy results have been achieved of late in the self-remoulding of the old intellectuals’ (*Peking Review*, 1959g: 16).
5. For example, compare *Peking Review* (1959k: 12; 1961a: 12); (1958c: 19; 1959k: 9); (1958i: 12; 1960o: 8; 1961a: 12); (1959g: 26; 1960a: 14, 17; 1961l: 18-19); (1959k: 11; 1961k: 8); (1958m: 3; 1959a: 13; 1960c: 16).
6. See for example (Chan, 2001: 15-17; Karl, 2010: 95-96). Meisner (2007: 110) sees ‘ambiguities and contradictions’ marking the Maoist variant of Marxism.
7. E.g. the U.S. prepares for a world war and local wars in order to ‘interfere in the internal affairs of other countries’ (*Peking Review*, 1960d: 16).
8. See also (1958h: 6-9; 1961f: 13).
9. A notable example of course is Chang (2002).

References

- Alden, C. (2007), *China in Africa: Partner, Competitor or Hegemon?* London: Zed Books.
- Asongu, S.A. and Aminkeng, G.A.A. (2013), “The Economic Consequences of China–Africa Relations: Debunking Myths in the Debate”, *Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 261-277. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14765284.2013.838384>
- Atkinson, J. (2018), “The Real East Asian Aid Model: Development Assistance as an Instrument of Comprehensive Security in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan”, *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 265-284. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12283>
- Atkinson, J. (2019), “Aid vs. ‘Aid’: Foreign Aid in Mao-Era China’s Public Diplomacy”, *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 196-214. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12569>
- Atkinson, J. (2021), “Chinese Foreign Aid Belief Systems: Comparing 1958–1961 and Today”, *Asian International Studies Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 115-142. <https://doi.org/10.1163/2667078X-bja10003>
- Balasubramanyam, V.N. (2015), “China and India’s Economic Relations with African Countries – Neo-colonialism Eastern Style? *Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 17-31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14765284.2014.994844>
- Blanchard, B. (2017, November 23), “China Grants Economic Aid to Djibouti, Site of Overseas Military Base”, <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-grants-economic-aid-to-djibouti-site-of-overseas-military-base-idUSKBN1DN126>>.
- Bond, P. (2014, April 10), “BRICS and the Tendency to Sub-imperialism”, *Pambazuka News*. <<http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/features/91303>>.

- Boorman, H.L. (1960), "The Study of Contemporary Chinese Politics: Some Remarks on Retarded Development", *World Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 585-599. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009339>
- Brautigam, D. (2011), *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brautigam, D. (2011), "Aid 'With Chinese Characteristics': Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC Aid Regime", *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 752-764. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1798>
- Breslin, S. (2011), "The 'China Model' and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 6, pp. 1323-1343. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01039.x>
- Brewster, D. (2017), "Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China's New Pathways in the Indian Ocean", *Geopolitics*, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 269-291. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1223631>
- Bronfenbrenner, U. (1961), "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 45-56. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1961.tb01682.x>
- Bruun, H.H. (2012), *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology: New Expanded Edition*, Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Callahan, W.A. (2012), *China: The Pessimist Nation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chan, A.L. (2001), *Mao's Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China's Great Leap Forward*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chang, H.-J. (2002), *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*, London: Anthem Press.
- Chau, D. (2014), *Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania*, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
- Chemingui, M.A. and Bchir, M.H. (2010), "The Future of African Trade with China under Alternative Trade Liberalization Schemes", *African Development Review*, Vol. 22, No. s1, pp. 562-576. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8268.2010.00264.x>
- Cheru, F. and Obi, C. (2011), "De-coding China-Africa Relations: Partnership for Development or '(neo) Colonialism by Invitation'?", *World Financial Review*, (Sep/Oct), pp. 72-75.
- Chin, G. (2012), "Two-Way Socialization: China, the World Bank, and Hegemonic Weakening", *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 211-230.
- Copper, J.F. (2016), *China's Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Volume I*, New York City: Palgrave Macmillan US.
- Dollar, D. (2016), "China's Engagement with Africa: From Natural Resources to Human Resources", <<https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Chinas-Engagement-with-Africa-David-Dollar-July-2016.pdf>>.
- Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B.C., Strange, A., and Tierney, M.J. (2017, October), *Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset* (AidData Working Paper, No. 46). <http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS46_Aid_China_and_Growth.pdf>.

- Du, D., Duan, D., Liu, C. and Ma, Y. (2016), "Twenty-five Years of Progress in Geopolitics Research: Efforts from China's Geographers", *Journal of Geographical Sciences*, Vol. 26, No. 8, pp. 1223-1242. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11442-016-1323-y>
- Elu, J.U. and Price, G.N. (2010), "Does China Transfer Productivity Enhancing Technology to Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Manufacturing Firms", *African Development Review*, Vol. 22, No. s1, pp. 587-598. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8268.2010.00260.x>
- Freeden, M. (1998), "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?", *Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 748-765. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00165>
- French, H.W. (2014), *China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Glenn, J. (2009), "Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 523-551. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00872.x>
- Haas, B. (2017, 18 October), "Xi Jinping Speech: Five Things You Need to Know", *The Guardian*, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/xi-jinping-speech-five-things-you-need-to-know>>.
- Hauner, T., Milanovic, B. and Naidu, S. (2017, November 30), "Inequality, Foreign Investment, and Imperialism (DRAFT)", Stone Center Working Paper, 2017, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3089701>.
- Heilmann, S. and Perry, E.J. (Eds.), (2011), *Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hirono, M. and Suzuki, S. (2014), "Why Do We Need 'Myth-Busting' in the Study of Sino-African Relations?", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 23, No. 87, pp. 443-461. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.843889>
- Holmes, J.R. and Yoshihara, T. (2008), *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan*, London, New York, NY: Routledge.
- Hu, Z. and Lu, D. (2016), "Re-interpretation of the Classical Geopolitical Theories in a Critical Geopolitical Perspective", *Journal of Geographical Sciences*, Vol. 26, pp. 1769-1784. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11442-016-1357-1>
- Johnston, A.I. (1995), "Thinking about Strategic Culture", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 32-64. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119>
- Johnston, A.I. (2007), *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Karl, R.E. (2010), *Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise History*, Durham and London: Duke University Press
- Lancaster, C. (2007), *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lenin, V.I. (2010), *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline*, London: Penguin.
- Lewis, J.W. and Xue, L. (1988), *China Builds the Bomb*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- List, F. (1909), *The National System of Political Economy* (trans. Sampson S. Lloyd, with an Introduction by J. Shield Nicholson), London: Longmans, Green and Co.

- Lovell, D.W. (1995), "Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List", *History of European Ideas*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 142-143. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599\(95\)90423-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(95)90423-9)
- Lumumba-Kasongo, T. (2011), "China-Africa Relations: A Neo-Imperialism or a Neo-Colonialism? A Reflection", *African and Asian Studies*, Vol. 10, Nos. 2-3, pp. 234-266. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156921011X587040>
- Mao, Z. (1977), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. V*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Martina, M. (2018, September 6), "Afghan troops to train in China, ambassador says", Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-afghanistan/afghan-troops-to-train-in-china-ambassador-says-idUSKCN1LM1MR>
- Marx, K., Engels, F. and Gasper, P. (2005). *The Communist Manifesto: A Road Map to History's Most Important Political Document*, Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
- Mearsheimer, J.J. (2010), "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 381-396. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poq016>
- Meisner, M. (2007), *Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Meyer, C.O. (2006), *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Morgenthau, H. (1962), "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 301-309.
- Naim, M. (2009, October 15), "Rogue Aid: What's Wrong with the Foreign Aid Programs of China, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia?", *Foreign Policy*, <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/15/rogue-aid/>>.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958a), Vol. I, No. 3, March 18, Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958b), Vol. I, No. 5, April 1, Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958c), Vol. I, No. 8, April 22. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958d), Vol. I, No. 9, April 29. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958e), Vol. I, No. 10, May 6. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958f), Vol. I, No. 11, May 13. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958g), Vol. I, No. 16, June 17. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958h), Vol. I, No. 18, July 1. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958i), Vol. I, No. 20, July 15. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958j), Vol. I, No. 23, August 5. Beijing: Peking Review.

- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958k), Vol. I, No. 24, August 12. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958l), Vol. I, No. 27, September 2. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958m), Vol. I, No. 31, September 30. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958n), Vol. I, No. 32, October 7. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958o), Vol. I, No. 35, October 28. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958p), Vol. I, No. 37, November 11. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958q), Vol. I, No. 38, November 18. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958r), Vol. I, No. 42, December 16. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1958s), Vol. I, No. 43, December 23. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959a), Vol. II, No. 1, January 6. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959b), Vol. II, No. 2, January 13. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959c), Vol. II, No. 7, February 17. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959d), Vol. II, No. 9, March 3. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959e), Vol. II, No. 14, April 7. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959f), Vol. II, No. 15, April 14. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959g), Vol. II, No. 16, April 21. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959h), Vol. II, No. 17, April 29. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959i), Vol. II, No. 22, June 2. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959j), Vol. II, No. 28, July 14. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959k), Vol. II, No. 29, July 21. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959l), Vol. II, No. 36, September 8. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959m), Vol. II, No. 45, November 10. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959n), Vol. II, No. 48, December 1. Beijing: Peking Review.

- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1959o), Vol. II, No. 51, December 22. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960a), Vol. III, No. 4, January 26. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960b), Vol. III, No. 7, February 16. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960c), Vol. III, No. 9, March 1. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960d), Vol. III, No. 11, March 15. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960e), Vol. III, No. 12, March 22. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960f), Vol. III, No. 15, April 12. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960g), Vol. III, No. 16, April 19. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960h), Vol. III, No. 18, May 3. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960i), Vol. III, No. 19, May 10. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960j), Vol. III, No. 23, June 7. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960k), Vol. III, No. 24, June 14. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960l), Vol. III, No. 27, July 5. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960m), Vol. III, No. 29, July 19. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960n), Vol. III, No. 47, November 22. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1960o), Vol. III, No. 49-50, December 13. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961a), Vol. IV, No. 4, January 27. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961b), Vol. IV, No. 5, February 3. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961c), Vol. IV, No. 8, February 24. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961d), Vol. IV, No. 11, March 17. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961e), Vol. IV, No. 14, April 7. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961f), Vol. IV, No. 21, May 26. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961g), Vol. IV, No. 22, June 2. Beijing: Peking Review.

- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961h), Vol. IV, No. 28, July 14. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961i), Vol. IV, No. 29, July 21. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961j), Vol. IV, No. 30, July 28. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961k), Vol. IV, No. 36, September 8. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961l), Vol. IV, No. 41, October 13. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961m), Vol. IV, No. 43, October 27. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961n), Vol. IV, No. 46, November 17. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961o), Vol. IV, No. 47, November 24. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Peking Review: A Weekly Magazine of Chinese News and Views* (1961p), Vol. IV, No. 50, December 15. Beijing: Peking Review.
- Perdue, C. (2015), "The Tenacious Tributary System", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 24, No. 96, pp. 1002-1014. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1030949>
- Pettis, M. (2013), *The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy*, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.
- Pratkanis, A.R. and Turner, M.E. (1996), "Persuasion and Democracy: Strategies for Increasing Deliberative Participation and Enacting Social Change", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 187-205. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1996.tb01369.x>
- Ray, D.M. (1975), "Chinese Perceptions of Social Imperialism and Economic Dependency: The Impact of Soviet Aid", *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 36-82.
- Reilly, J. (2012), "A Northeast Asian Model of ODA? Comparing Chinese, Japanese and Korean Official Development Assistance", in C.M. Dent and J. Dosch (eds.), *The Asia-Pacific, Regionalism and the Global System* (pp. 216-234), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Reuters (2011, June 11), "Clinton Warns against 'New Colonialism' in Africa", <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clinton-africa/clinton-warns-against-new-colonialism-in-africa-idUSTRE75A0RI20110611>>.
- Samuels, R.J. (2007), *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, New York, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Sanusi, L. (2013, March 12), "Africa Must Get Real about Chinese Ties", *Financial Times*, <<https://www.ft.com/content/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f-00144feabdc0>>.
- Sato, J., and Shimomura, Y. (eds.) (2013), *The Rise of Asian Donors: Japan's Impact on the Evolution of Emerging Donors*, Oxon, UK: Routledge.
- Sautman, B. and Yan, H. (2006). *East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, the West, and "Colonialism" in Africa*, Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law.

- Shu, G.Z. (1999), "Between 'Paper' and 'Real Tigers': Mao's View of Nuclear Weapons", in J.L. Gaddis, P. Gordon, E. May and J. Rosenberg (eds.), *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945* (pp. 194-216), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Silverstein, B. and Flamenbaum, C. (1989), "Biases in the Perception and Cognition of the Actions of Enemies", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 51-72. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1989.tb01542.x>
- Snyder, J. (1977), *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- Snyder, J. (1991), *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Stokke, O. (ed.) (1989), *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden*, Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
- Stuart-Fox, M. (2003), *A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence*, Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
- Szporluk, R. (1991), *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tao, G. (2015, November 27), "China Voice: Who's Africa's Neo-colonialist?", *Xinhua*, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/27/c_134861773.htm>.
- Terrill, R., Xingwang, Z., Huosheng, T., Ying, C. and Li, A.F. (eds.) (2016), *Xi Jinping's China Renaissance: Historical Mission and Great Power Strategy*, Jericho, New York: CN Times Books Inc.
- Truman Papers (1950, April 12), A Report to the National Security Council – NSC 68 (President's Secretary's File), <<https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/report-national-security-council-nsc-68?documentid=NA&pagenumber=1>>.
- Ungor, C. (2009), "Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist Propaganda Abroad (1949-1976)", Ph.D. dissertation, Binghamton University State University of New York, Binghamton, NY.
- Wang, D. (2006), "The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962 (COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER #49)", Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Warmerdam, W. and de Haan, A. (2015), "The Dialectics of China's Foreign Aid: Interactions Shaping China's Aid Policy", *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 617-648. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-015-0082-y>
- Westad, O.A. (1998), "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the United States", in O.A. Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (pp. 165-188), Washington, DC & Stanford, California: Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford University Press.
- Yan, X. (2014), "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 153-184. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pou027>
- Zhang, D. and Smith, G. (2017), "China's Foreign Aid System: Structure, Agencies, and Identities", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 10, pp. 2330-2346. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1333419>

- Zhao, S. (2014), "A Neo-Colonialist Predator or Development Partner? China's Engagement and Rebalance in Africa", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 23, No. 90, pp. 1033-1052. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.898893>
- Zhou, H. and Xiong, H. (eds.), (2017), *China's Foreign Aid: 60 Years in Retrospect*, Singapore: Springer.
- Zhou, H., Zhang, J. and Zhang, M. (2015), *Foreign Aid in China*. Berlin; Heidelberg: Social Sciences Academic Press (China) and Springer-Verlag.

